Department of Philosophy

[Goethe and Hegel. Contours of an Epistemological Monism]

In an overall picture of the philosophical complex of German Idealism and Early Romanticism, the problem of knowledge, both as reflection about the faculty of knowledge and as endeavor to gain knowledge, seems to be at its core. Among the protagonists of this complex stand out, concerning the problem of knowledge, especially Goethe and Hegel. They are of particular interest, insofar as both of them start out from a fundamental trust in the faculty of knowledge, and correspondingly carry out their cognitive activity in their respective fields of research. Since they were convinced that in the process of knowledge it is possible to let the essence of an object speak, and thus to gain an objective knowledge, there arises the question whether it is possible to identify certain principles in their philosophical thought, which underlie their trust in the faculty of knowledge, and which could conduce to articulating an epistemological standpoint. It will come about that Goethe’s and Hegel’s apparently dogmatic trust in the faculty of knowledge rests, in truth, on a coherent and consistent epistemological standpoint, which, in accord with its principles, may be designated as an epistemological monism.

[Justification of Transcendental Knowledge. Study on Fichte’s “Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo”]

This term paper addresses the question of how Fichte justifies transcendental knowledge. He considers the immanence of consciousness to be the point of departure of his investigations. At this point there are present in consciousness not only different representations, but also the implicit assumption that these representations correspond to real objects outside of consciousness. Thus Fichte asks himself how does one come up to this assumption and whether the representations inside of consciousness have reality or objective validity altogether. To answer this question is for Fichte the purpose of philosophy.

Since none of the representations present in consciousness are accompanied by certainty, Fichte begins to investigate the process by which these representations come about. The problem is that, due to their transcendental nature, he could never accomplish his task if he considered the coming about of the representations of objects outside of consciousness, so that he rather examines the coming about of the representation of the I. In the bringing about of the concept of the I, Fichte finds the paradigmatic process for every human knowing activity. His detailed, both genetic as well as phenomenological examination of the conditions or laws of this process should provide the basis to justify the knowledge of objects outside of consciousness, whether they are of sensible or supersensible nature.

[Reconquer of the Spirit. Study on Novalis’ Conception of the Faculty of Knowledge in “Blüthenstaub”]

This term paper examines Novalis’ conception of the faculty of knowledge. Novalis makes a negative historical diagnosis of the consciousness of his modern time, which consists in the circumstance that humanity has lost its conscious access to the spirit. This state of human consciousness has for Novalis negative psychological and social consequences, insofar as the possibility to give the individual, cultural and social life an organic form as well as a higher meaning seems to have been lost. As a reaction and response to this state of affairs, Novalis offers a perspective to overcome the shadowing of human consciousness. His renewal impulse consists in the development of new and higher forms of knowledge, so as to reconquer the spirit for humanity. Thus the spiritual should be sought and found within the human being, whereby all of his activities, initiatives and institutions could also be spiritualized.

[The Problem of the Foundation of Metaphysics as Science Through a Critique of the Faculty of Knowledge. Study on Kant’s “Kritik der reinen Vernunft”]

This term paper problematizes Kant’s attempt to establish a foundation for critical metaphysics through a critic of the faculty of knowledge. Kant’s diagnosis of dogmatic metaphysics and doubt on the truth claim of its propositions reveal, on closer examination, to rest upon certain uncriticized premises. Particularly, Kant seems to presuppose a particular understanding of the concepts of experience, intuition, metaphysics and apriority, which he doesn’t make the subject of his critic and which inevitably determine the outcome of his investigations, that is, the establishment of boundaries for theoretical reason. His premises compelled him to constrain his investigations to the conditions of possibility of empirical knowledge and to reject from the outset the possibility of a supersensible experience and knowledge. Thus, Kant absolutizes and generalizes a particular moment of human reason, that is, the moment of its incapacity to know the supersensible. In view of certain advances of Novalis and Fichte, which are considered very briefly, this paper tries to show a perspective for the foundation of metaphysics as science of the supersensible.

[Outline and Difficulties of a Morphology of Right. Study on Hegel’s “Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts”]

This term paper examines Hegel’s attempt to establish a philosophy of right that sets itself the scientific task to know and to demonstrate the essence of right and the realization, becoming and development of this essence into its different forms of existence and transitions. In this sense, it can be said that Hegel attempts to establish a morphology of right, whose central epistemological and methodological premises seem to be in accord with and to some extent indebted to Goethe’s conception of science, particularly to his theory of metamorphosis.

This paper problematizes furthermore Hegel’s morphology of right by identifying two difficulties that present his results. The first difficulty concerns Hegel’s conviction that the essence or, as he says, the idea of right is freedom and that the highest developmental form of this idea is the State. By following the different forms of the development depicted by Hegel it appears that, in contrast to his conviction, this development and these forms correspond and belong to the idea of equality, insofar as all of these forms, including the State, constitute a sphere that, resting on the assumption that all persons are equal, provides an order that makes a just, juridical and peaceful coexistence of free individuals possible. The second difficulty concerns Hegel’s conviction that ethical life consists of a system of concrete and universally valid duties. This view ultimately implies the dissolution of individuality and ethical creativity in favor of the ethical homogenization of citizens, and so of a conservativism concerning the values and ethical principles of society as well as of the self-perpetuation of the same ethical order.

[The Problem of the Purity of Experience in William James]

This term paper problematizes James’ concept of experience. Dualism constitutes for James the origin of the major problems of philosophy. He considers that, due to such a dualistic presupposition, these philosophical problems have acquired a paradoxical character, so that they don’t let themselves be solved. Consequently, James tries to find a neutral and non-dualistic principle, on which he could ground his worldview and provide a solution to the different contentious issues of philosophy, such as consciousness, cognition, intersubjectivity, lifestyle and religiosity. This principle is for James the notion of pure experience, on which he then grounds his radical empiricism. James characterizes pure experience in such a way that it seems necessary to examine whether the alleged purity of experience is really such. It will come about that, in despite of his attempt, James’ concept of pure experience remains impure and ingrained in the sensible and the empirical, so that he eventually arrives to a strange form of monism, in which the spiritual and the rational are not negated, but nevertheless rooted in the empirical and thus falsified.

[Equality as Essence of the Political. Study on the Concept of the Political in Relation with the Concepts of Equality, Justice and Right]

This term paper addresses the question of the essence of the political. Since an intellectual paradigm change took place in France in the 1970s, which in the field of political philosophy consisted in the critical questioning of traditional concepts and norms that served to analyze and govern society, this question has received particular attention from the French tradition of political philosophy. Particularly, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy are those, who, with their book “Rejouer le politique,” published in 1981, are considered to be the initiators of the philosophical discussion about the concepts of politics and the political. Despite the heterogeneity of the thinkers of this tradition, the tendency of their deliberations seems to be the establishing of a categorial difference between the concepts of politics and the political. On the one side, politics is understood as an established system of power that includes different instances, institutions, mechanisms and disciplines, with the aid of which, and starting from an hegemonic ideology, politics tries to maintain the order in society. On the other side, the political is understood as a space of spontaneity and vitality, in which civil society expresses its voice and action and confronts the established system of power.

After a closer examination of the concepts of the political and of equality, this paper will argue, in contrast with the considered tradition of thought, that politics and the political are not to be understood as two categorially different concepts. Instead, it will come about that these are in reality two moments of the same unity, which is given by the cohesive, permeating and inherent principle of equality. Thus it will turn out that the essence of the political is the principle of equality. This means that the whole political life of society, which includes the entire spectrum of political feelings, convictions, demands, deeds and institutionalizations as well as the ideals of justice, right and democracy, unfolds and develops itself from this principle.

[The Becoming-Immanent of the Transcendent. Study on Novalis’ “Hymnen an die Nacht” from an Epistemic View]

This term paper addresses the question whether Novalis’ “Hymnen an die Nacht” may be understood as a text with epistemic value. Since in this text there are depicted certain experiences and occurrences that seem to belong to a metaphysical sphere, the question arises whether the possibility of such an experience can be epistemologically justified. Through an examination of Novalis’ own conception of knowledge it will come about that for Novalis the faculty of knowledge is capable to ascend to a knowledge of the living and the metaphysical. Thereby are of central importance the imagination and an organ acquired through the enhancement and potentization of the I. It will be possible to find in the “Hymnen” the motive of an epistemic-aesthetic mediation between the I and the metaphysical, by means of which the transcendental becomes immanent in human consciousness. Thus it will become clear that Novalis’ depiction of the becoming-immanent of the transcendental is in accord with and rests upon his own epistemological conception. In this sense, the “Hymnen” could be considered as a text not only with aesthetic, but also with epistemic value.

[On Happiness as an Affective Byproduct of the Unity of Subject and Object]

This term paper examines the problem of happiness within the context of contemporary philosophy, and inquires into the conditions that make the question for and the pursuit of happiness possible.

The reconsideration of this problem in philosophy is part of a relatively recent interest to rehabilitate and revitalize an ethics of the good life, in contrast with an ethics of duty or of the norms of actions. Thus, the tendency can be observed to pose again the question for eudaemonia and to address it with the instrumentarium contemporary philosophy has to offer, especially analytic and pragmatist. The considerations contained in this paper are thus developed within this context and in confrontation with the physiognomy the discussions on this problem have there acquired.

After a critical examination of the theories of happiness and well-being, it will come about, among other things, that contemporary philosophy of happiness rests on the double dogmatic belief that human life directs itself teleologically towards an end, and that this supreme end corresponds to happiness or well-being, that is, to eudaemonia. Thus, by making these premises explicit, there arises the question for their legitimacy, which in turn creates the possibility for a debate regarding the problem of the compatibility between teleology of human life and freedom of the human being, as well as regarding the problem of the justification of the belief that the supreme end of human life is precisely eudaemonia and not other.

Then, after a genetic examination of the question for happiness, it will turn out that this question presupposes the lost of happiness and that its absence motivates its pursuit. In this sense, this paper will argue that this lost and this pursuit are intimately related to the lost of and the striving for the unity of subject and object. This striving can in turn acquire two basic forms, depending on which principle is predominantly active, that is, the principle of receptivity and passivity or the principle of productivity and activity. Thus, the pursuit of happiness can be understood either as a striving for completion or perfection, or as a striving to configure life and the world according to one’s own representations. Finally, it will become clear that happiness can acquire different forms of manifestation, but that it will always consist in an affective byproduct that accompanies the unity, total or partial, of subject and object.

[Human Freedom as Adequate Causality in the Act of Intuitive Self-Knowledge. Study on Spinoza’s “Ethics”]

This term paper examines the relation between human freedom and intuitive knowledge within the context of Spinoza’s “Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order.” There are mainly two distinguishable forms of human freedom in Spinoza’s “Ethics.” The first one, on which there is general agreement, corresponds to the idea of freedom as emancipation of the dominion of determining factors, such as passive affects and inadequate ideas. Through such a process of emancipation, which includes the forming of adequate ideas and the production of active affects, the human soul could reach a state of wisdom and happiness. The second one, for which this paper argues, corresponds to the potency of the human intellect to cause adequately the supreme act of intuitive self-knowledge, in which he coincides with and participates in the productive and causal activity of the substance, that is, in its absolute freedom. Through this act, the human being not only knows himself as an inherent part of the divine substance, but also the substance, in its mode human being, knows itself as the immanent cause of all that is, and also knows the human being, insofar as he reaches his self-knowledge as a singular thing. Thus, it will come about that freedom consists in the productive activity of the substance accompanied by the self-consciousness of the human being.

[Aristotle and Pindar. Tyche Between mythos and logos]

This term paper examines both Aristotle’s and Pindar’s concept of chance and fortune, and tries to demonstrate that the epistemological resistance of such events to conceptual form and determination reveals a tension within reason between two of its constitutive tendencies, that is, between the tendency to logical and the tendency to mythical apprehension of reality.

[Adequate Perception of Temporal Objects. Study on Husserl’s “Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins”]

This term paper examines the notion of adequate perception of temporal objects within the context of Husserl’s lectures “Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins.” After the systematic position that the problem of time occupies in Husserl’s philosophical project is briefly delimited, the focus of this paper will be directed to the problem of the constitution and perception of temporal objects and it will try to reconstruct immanently the notion of adequate perception of temporal objects. It will come about that this notion is an essential idea to understand Husserl’s phenomenology of time. The centrality of such a notion is justified by the fact that it advances from a punctual and discrete to an extended concept of perception. Thus, according to the analyzed notion, perception is configured as a temporal field that unifies impressional, retentive and protensive consciousness. This is possible due to the fact that perception consists in a spontaneous act that, following the law of modification, constitutes the temporal modi of past, present and future, thus configuring the continuous network of phenomenological time.

[On the Tragic Inner Experience of the Paradox of Reason]

This term paper examines the so-called paradox of reason, and, in consideration of its aesthetic and affective dimension, it depicts the sense in which it can be said that the subjective experience of this paradox corresponds to an experience of tragic character. It is shown that the paradox of reason, that is, the circumstance in which reason must necessarily pose questions that it necessarily must leave without answer, can cause the so-called pain of reflection. By analyzing Goethe’s notion of the tragic, according to which the experience of the tragic corresponds to an experience of a necessary opposition, this paper depicts the tragic form in which the experience of the paradox of reason and the pain of reflection are represented in his “Faust.”

[The Self-Intellection of the Human Intellect Consists in the Intellection of the Intelligible. Noetic Self-Reference in Aristotle’s and Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Psychology]

This term paper inquires into the form that the problem of self-reference of thought acquires in Aristotle’s and Alexander of Aphrodisias’ psychological considerations, that is, it examines—according to their formulation—the problem of the self-intellection of the human intellect. By analyzing certain key passages of their respective psychological writings, it will come about that Aristotle and Alexander conceive the self-intellection of the human intellect as the intellection of the intelligible. This means that, according to these philosophers, the human intellect would intelligize itself every time that it intelligizes an intelligible form, insofar as, in this act of intellection, both the intellect and the form become identical.

[Human Freedom as Adequate Causality in the Act of Intuitive Self-Knowledge. Study on Spinoza’s “Ethics”]

This article examines the relation between human freedom and intuitive knowledge within the context of Spinoza’s “Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order.” There are mainly two distinguishable forms of human freedom in Spinoza’s “Ethics.” The first one, on which there is general agreement, corresponds to the idea of freedom as emancipation of the dominion of determining factors, such as passive affects and inadequate ideas. Through such a process of emancipation, which includes the forming of adequate ideas and the production of active affects, the human soul can reach a state of wisdom and happiness. The second one, for which this paper argues, corresponds to the potency of the human intellect to cause adequately the supreme act of intuitive self-knowledge, in which he coincides with and participates in the productive and causal activity of the substance, that is, in its absolute freedom.

[Immanuel Hermann Fichte’s Philosophical Thought in the Context of Postidealistic Philosophy]

This term paper—written as part of my dissertation project—addresses Immanuel Hermann Fichte’s philosophical and anthropological thought. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796–1879) is one of those German philosophers of the 19th century, whose work, in spite of encompassing the main areas of philosophy, such as epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, theology, philosophy of religion, anthropology, psychology, ethics, and theory of society, has been unjustly ignored by philosophical research both of historical and systematic orientation. Since postidealistic philosophy, in general, and Fichte’s philosophical thought, in particular, still remain a research desideratum, the present paper attempts, in a tentative and preliminary form, to situate his philosophical thought within the historical context of postidealistic philosophy, and to outline his philosophical project in order to present its main objectives, core questions, and fundamental ideas, which, in the form of a heuristic principle, could guide future systematic investigations of his work.